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CORPORATIONS
LIABILITY OF CORPORATION FOR CONTRACT
EXECUTED BY AGENT ACTING WITHOUT AUTHORITY
Louisiana, Texas. In Jones v. Shreveport Lodge No. 122,
BPOE,' the Supreme Court of Louisiana adhered strictly to the
general rule that an act of an agent in excess of his authority
will not bind a corporation; persons dealing with him act at their
peril if they do not first ascertain his authority.2 In this case
plaintiffs' suit for specific performance of a contract to sell prop-
erty was denied, although the defendant corporation's board of
trustees, board of directors, and members of the Lodge assembled
in a regular business meeting approved recommendations of the
building committee and adopted resolutions to accept plaintiffs'
offer and authorized its president to sign all deeds necessary to
carry out the proposed contract. Plaintiffs and defendant, acting
through its designated officers, then entered into a contract
whereby plaintiffs were to acquire the property. There was no
question as to the integrity or motives of the designated officials,
and it is interesting to note that the persons who acted on behalf
of the corporation were all members of the Bar who certified
that they were duly authorized to act for the corporation.
In refusing to consummate the sale, the defendant claimed
that the officials had acted pursuant to an invalid and illegal
resolution, since proper notice had not been given to the members
of the Lodge of the purpose of the business meeting and therefore
the officers did not have authority to enter into a contract for the
sale of the property in question. Louisiana statutory requirements
provide:
... [A] corporation may... sell.., its immovable property, only if a
resolution so authorizing has been approved by the governing body
1221 La. 968, 60 So. 2d 889 (1952).
2 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (Rev. ed. 1946) 137.
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of the corporation at a regular or special meeting, convened after
notice of its purpose.8 (Italics added.)
The notice which had been sent to all members read as follows:
Special Notice - Important. Leon Hendrick, chairman of the build-
ing committee, announces that at this week's meeting the plan and
report of the building committee relative to a proposed New Elks
Home will be presented. This will be your only notice, and since this
is a very important matter, you are requested to be present.
Plaintiffs argued that this notice was sufficient compliance
with the statutory requirement, as the members of the Lodge had
known for some time that the building committee was studying
plans for acquiring a new lodge and that these plans would
necessitate the sale of property held by the Lodge. Six of the
eleven members presently opposing the sale had participated in
the business meeting of the Lodge, and the vote of the other five
could not have changed the result. All officers of the corporation
who testified at the trial agreed that the contract was valid and
that the plaintiffs were entitled to specific performance.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana rejected this argument and
held that, since the corporation owed its existence to the state,
it could function only in accordance with the law creating it.
Statutory requirements were held to be "sacramental," and
failure to comply strictly with these requirements had rendered
the resolution void and the ensuing contract nugatory. The court
stated that a person who deals with a corporation is charged with
notice of statutory limitations and is generally bound to know
whether or not the person who assumes to represent the corpora-
tion is authorized to do so. The court did not cite any cases directly
in point but relied on Corpus ]uris Secundum,4 American Juris-
312 LA. STAT. ANN., REV. STAT. (West, 1951) § 113.
4 "If... the governing statute requires powers conferred to be exercised in a par-
ticular manner... and the provision is not merely directory, it cannot legally exercise
them otherwise." 19 C. J. S., Corporations, § 960. A person dealing with a corporation
is chargeable with notice of limitations and restrictions imposed by statute. Id., § 997.
However, this same Section states in a later paragraph that "in the absence of notice
to the contrary, persons dealing with the corporation may rely on a statement in their
deeds or contracts or in a certificate purporting to set forth the minutes of the board
of directors."
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prudence,5 and four Louisiana cases' which actually were dis-
tinguishable.
In the case of F. H. Woodruff & Sons, Inc. v. Schuster7 a Texas
court was more liberal and upheld the validity of a contract made
by an unauthorized agent on the basis that the agent had apparent
authority.' Schuster, a farmer in Hidalgo County, Texas, pur.
chased a quantity of "California Wonder" pepper seed from
F. H. Woodruff and Sons, Inc., a Connecticut corporation. By
mistake the seller delivered another variety of seed, but the error
was not discovered until the plants began to grow. Schuster notified
Wesley Gould, a branch manager for the seller in its office at
Mercedes, Texas, and Gould agreed that a mistake had been made.
A month later (November, 1949) Gould went to Schuster's
farm and took with him E. E. Parker of Atlanta, Georgia. Parker
was introduced as a director of the corporation, who had been
sent by the president to make a settlement with Schuster on behalf
of the corporation. In December, 1949, F. H. Woodruff, the
president of the corporation, went to Schuster's farm and ex-
pressed satisfaction with the settlement that had been made.
5"Where a statute ... prescribes the manner in which notice of a meeting of the
corporation shall be given, compliance with its requirements is essential to a valid
notice ... ." 13 AM. JuR., Corporations, § 477. Also see 13 AM. JuR., Corporations, §§ 20,
739, 746.
GIn Pierce v. New Orleans Building Company, 9 La. 397 (1836), assent of stock-
holders was obtained individually and not in a regular stockholders' meeting. The pro-
ceeding was held to be null and void. In Jeanerette Rice and Milling Company v. Du-
rocher, 123 La. 160, 48 So. 780 (1909), the president received verbal assent given sep-
arately by a majority of the individual directors. It was held that such assent cannot
be recognized as having the force and effect of a resolution adopted by the board. In
T. P. Ranch Company v. Gueydon and Riley, 148 La. 455, 87 So. 234 (1921), a lease of
corporate property by two of three directors without knowledge of the third director,
the lessee knowing of the irregularity, was held void in absence of estoppel. In Rome v.
New River Lodge No. 402, F. & A. M., 197 So. 174 (La. App. 1940), plaintiff had notice
of lack of authority of a corporate agent. It was held to be the duty of every person
entering into a contract with a corporation to see that the person representing the cor-
poration has proper authority.
7248 S. W. 2d 196 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
8 "When a principal has placed an agent in such a situation that a person of ordi-
nary prudence, conversant with business usages ... is led to believe that the agent has
authority.., one dealing with the agent is justified in presuming such authority to have
been given." 2 Tax. Jur., Agency, § 39 et seq.
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The corporation later refused to perform in accordance with
the alleged settlement, and plaintiff brought suit to enforce the
agreement. Judgment was rendered for plaintiff based on the jury
finding of the above stated facts and on the jury finding that E. E.
Parker was acting "within the apparent scope of his authority."
The record showed that the board of directors had not given
authority to Woodruff or Parker to enter into any settlement agree.
ment, and both denied having done so. Appellant corporation
contended that it should have been granted an instructed verdict or
judgment non obstante veredicto, but judgment of the trial court
was affirmed.
This case is of interest as it appears to be a mild departure
from the general rule and the Texas rule that an act of an agent
in excess of his authority will not bind a corporation and persons
dealing with him are bound to ascertain his authority If they
act without such inquiry, they act at their peril, and the represen-
tation of an agent that he has authority does not result in apparent
authority.1"
The court of civil appeals did not feel that Schuster was acting
at his peril after he had done all that he could do to deal with
authorized agents of the company. As a practical matter he could
not go to Connecticut to examine the minutes of the board of direc-
tors to see if a resolution had been passed authorizing Parker
and Woodruff to negotiate his claim against the company, and
he was justified in dealing with the branch manager and such
agents as came to Texas to discuss the matter with him. The
court was not too clear as to the specific grounds that support a
finding of apparent authority and seems to have taken several
factors into consideration, though no one would have been suffi-
cient in itself. It stressed the fact that Gould as general manager
9 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (Rev. ed. 1946) 137. Adkins-Polk Co. v. Pate, 11
S. W. 2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
10 Henderson Mercantile Company v. First National Bank of McKinney, 100 Tex.
344, 99 S. W. 850 (1907).
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of a branch office was presumed to be a general agent of the
corporation" and that under all the circumstances of this case
Schuster had a right to rely on his representation that Parker
and Woodruff had authority to settle the claim.
The argument that Gould as general agent could clothe Parker
and Woodruff with apparent authority 2 is weakened by the fact
that there was no representation that Gould had authority to settle
the claim, and Schuster seemed to understand that he did not
have such authority. It would appear that any presumption that
Gould was a general agent of the company was negated by
Schuster's knowledge that he was not such an agent. Schuster
relied on his agreement with Parker, and Parker certainly had
no authority, as directors are supposed to act as a board and not
in an individual capacity."
Since the court gave considerable thought to the ratification of
Woodruff, it must have felt that the corporation was not bound
at the time Parker and Schuster reached their agreement. If
Woodruff did not have proper authority, it is difficult to see how
his ratification could validate the previous agreement unless
Gould, as general agent, had in some way conveyed apparent
authority to Woodruff. If Schuster had a right to rely on the
representations of Gould, the ratification of Woodruff would
have been unnecessary as the contract would have been valid when
entered into by Parker.
The net result of this case seems to be that the court will make
every effort to uphold a finding of apparent authority of an agent
of a corporation when the other party has used all practical means
to ascertain the agent's authority. Thus, the other party is not
acting at his peril if he has good reason to rely on the representa-
11 McAfee v. Travis Gas Corp., 137 Tex. 314, 153 S. W. 2d 442 (1941) ; Western
Cottage Piano and Organ Co. v. Anderson, 97 Tex. 432, 79 S. W. 516 (1904).
Y2 "A general agent.., stands in the shoes of the principal and may do anything...
that the principal could have done." McKaughan v. Baldwin, 153 S. W. 660, 661 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1913) er. rel. w. m.
'a The fact that a person assuming to act for a corporation is a director does not
even raise a presumption that he is its authorized agent. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS
(Rev. ed. 1946) 137.
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tions of the agent. While the court commented on the impracti-
cality of going to Connecticut to read the minutes of the board of
directors, it did not comment on the customary practice of re-
quiring that a certified copy of the minutes be provided for the
purpose of establishing authority.
RENEWAL FILING FEE REQUIRED OF FOREIGN CORPORATION
Texas. In the case of Chicago Corporation v. Shepperd"4 the
plaintiff was a Delaware corporation that was issued a permit in
1941 to do business in Texas. A maximum filing fee of $2500
was paid as required by statute.' 5 In 1951 plaintiff corporation
applied for a renewal of its permit, and the Secretary of State
refused to file the application until appellant paid another filing
fee of $2500. This amount was paid under protest, and suit was
filed for its recovery. Plaintiff claimed that, since it had previ-
ously paid the maximum filing fee required by law, it was entitled
to file its application for a renewal of its permit without the pay.
ment of additional filing fees. Both the trial court and the appel-
late court held that an application for renewal of a permit must
be construed as an application for a permit and, therefore, the
renewal applicant would be required to pay the filing fee fixed
by statute although the maximum fee had been paid for the period
of the original permit.
This was a case of first impression, but the judgment of the
court was supported by very strong authority. 6 Passage of pres-
14 248 S. W. 2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
15 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 3914.
16 In General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. McCallum, 118 Tex. 46, 10 S. W.
2d 687 (1928), it was held that when a limit of $2500 had been paid under a permit,
additional amendments could be filed without payment of fees. If a new permit were
taken out when an amendment is tendered, the statutory limit could be collected again.
In Flowers v. Pecos River Railroad Co., 138 Tex. 18, 156 S. W. 2d 260 (1941), the
Pecos River Railroad Company was a domestic corporation which filed a renewal of
its corporate charter for 50 years. The court held that such renewal was the filing of
a charter within the meaning of TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 3914. It
would follow that a foreign corporation should not be given privileges denied to a
domestic corporation, and an Attorney General's Opinion of 1939 advised that a foreign
corporation could not change its "purpose clause," since TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon,
1948) art. 1314 prevented a domestic corporation from doing so.
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ently proposed legislation would codify the question raised in
this case.' 7
Randolph Scott.
17 Article 136 of the Proposed Texas Business Corporation Act, as prepared by the
Special Committee on Revision of Corporation Laws of Texas, State Bar of Texas, re-
quires the Secretary of State to collect a filing fee of $50.00 for an original or renewal
application of a foreign corporation for a certificate of authority to transact business in
Texas.
